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Abstract  - This paper argues that Ellsberg’s and Shackle’s frameworks for discussing the limits of 
the (subjective) probabilistic approach to decision theory are not as different as they may appear. To 
stress the common elements in their theories Keynes’s Treatise on Probability provides an essential 
starting point. Keynes’s rejection of well-defined probability functions, and of maximisation as a 
guide to human conduct, is shown to imply a reconsideration of what probability theory can 
encompass that is in the same vein of Ellsberg’s and Shackle’s concern in the years of the 
consolidation of Savage’s new probabilistic mainstream. The parallel between Keynes and the two 
decision theorists is drawn by means of a particular assessment of Shackle’s theory of decision, 
namely, it is interpreted in the light of Ellsberg’s doctoral dissertation. In this thesis, published only 
as late as 2001, Ellsberg developed the details and devised the philosophical background of his 
criticism of Savage as first put forward in the famed 1961 QJE article. The paper discusses the 
grounds on which the ambiguity surrounding the decision maker in Ellsberg’s urn experiment can 
be deemed analogous to the uncertainty faced by Shackle’s entrepreneur taking “unique decisions.” 
The paper argues also that the insights at the basis of the work of both Shackle and Ellsberg, as well 
as the criteria for decision under uncertainty they put forward, are relevant to understand the 
development of modern decision theory. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
George L. S. Shackle and Daniel Ellsberg represent two main positions among the critics of 
the forthcoming (at their time) mainstream in modern decision theory as represented by 
Savage’s  Foundations of Statistics (1954). Although both opposed maximisation of 
(subjective) expected utility as a criterion for choice under uncertainty, at first their theoretical 
enterprises appear to have few points in common. 
Ellsberg (1961) introduced the notion of “ambiguity” to analyse actual decision-
makers acting in a context that, though confounding and denoted by information perceived as 
scanty, can be represented through an exhaustive list of the possible states of the world. The 
paradoxical results of his thought experiment about choices from urns containing coloured 
balls in unknown proportions were confirmed by early experimental evidence (Becker and 
Brownson 1964). But, after a brief round of discussion (Raiffa 1961 and Brewer 1963), 
Ellsberg’s results were put aside, “simply because researchers at the time were helpless to 
address them” (Machina 2001, xxxix). It is likely that the fact that Ellsberg never became an 
academic – because of his involvement first with Rand Corporation as strategic analyst and 
then with the U. S. Government as consultant during the Vietnam War – contributed to the 
decline of interest in his paradox. This neglect has been unfortunate, however, because 
Ellsberg’s dissertation submitted to the Economics Department of Harvard University in 1962 
is a major achievement. It provides such a thorough discussion of decision criteria for solving 
the paradox that, had it been published in the 1960s, it would have surely contributed to the 
progress of research attempting to represent the behaviour brought to light by the paradox.
1 
Only since the late 1980s the paradox has become a focus of interest to decision theorists, as 
demonstrated by an exponential growth in the literature (surveyed for the first time in Kelsey 
and Quiggin 1992). 
As regards Shackle (1949 and 1955), he insisted that the notion of uncertainty could 
not be reduced either to aleatory probability or subjective probability. In doing so he gave 
birth to a strand of thought emphasizing the role of “fundamental uncertainty” in decision-
making, a perspective especially taken up by Keynesians and Austrians (Lachmann 1976 and 
Davidson 1983). Shackle rejected the use of probability measures in decision theory on the 
basis that the context of crucial entrepreneurial decisions is characterized by the fact that the 
list of possible states of the world known to the entrepreneur is not exhaustive. Shackle’s 
                                                 
1   Ellsberg’s thesis was published only as late as 2001 (Ellsberg 2001). 1. Introduction 
 
George L. S. Shackle and Daniel Ellsberg represent two main positions among the critics of 
the forthcoming (at their time) mainstream in modern decision theory as represented by 
Savage’s  Foundations of Statistics (1954). Although both opposed maximisation of 
(subjective) expected utility as a criterion for choice under uncertainty, at first their theoretical 
enterprises appear to have few points in common. 
Ellsberg (1961) introduced the notion of “ambiguity” to refer to situations in which, 
due to lack of information, there is uncertainty about probabilities on events. Ellsberg aimed 
to work in the footsteps of Knight (1921) and his notion of “unmeasurable uncertainty,” but 
started from the analysis of actual decisions to be taken in a context that, though confounding 
and denoted by information perceived as scanty, can be represented through an exhaustive list 
of the possible states of the world. The paradoxical results of his thought experiment about 
choices from urns containing coloured balls in unknown proportions were confirmed by early 
experimental evidence (Becker and Brownson 1964). But, after a brief round of discussion 
(Raiffa 1961, Brewer 1963, Ellsberg 1963, and Brewer and Fellner 1965), Ellsberg’s results 
were put aside, “simply because researchers at the time were helpless to address them” 
(Machina 2001, xxxix).
1 The experimental evidence was to became huge in the following 
years (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, and Camerer and Weber 1992), but only since the late 
1980s the paradox has become a focus of interest to decision theorists, as demonstrated by an 
exponential growth in the literature (surveyed for the first time in Kelsey and Quiggin 1992). 
As regards Shackle (1949 and 1955), he insisted that the notion of uncertainty could 
not be reduced either to aleatory probability or subjective probability. In doing so he gave 
birth to a strand of thought emphasizing the role of “fundamental uncertainty” in decision-
making, a perspective especially taken up by Keynesians and Austrians (Lachmann 1976 and 
Davidson 1983). Shackle rejected the use of probability measures in decision theory on the 
basis that the context of crucial entrepreneurial decisions is characterized by the fact that the 
list of possible states of the world known to the entrepreneur is not exhaustive. Shackle’s 
                                                 
1  It is likely that the fact that Ellsberg never became an academic – because of his involvement 
first with Rand Corporation as strategic analyst and then with the U. S. Government as consultant 
during the Vietnam War – contributed to the decline of interest in his paradox. This neglect has been 
unfortunate, however, because Ellsberg’s dissertation submitted to the Economics Department of 
Harvard University in 1962 is a major achievement. It provides such a thorough discussion of decision 
criteria for solving the paradox that, had it been published in the 1960s, it would have surely 
contributed to the progress of research attempting to represent the behaviour brought to light by the 
paradox. Ellsberg’s thesis was published only as late as 2001 (Ellsberg 2001).   2
extreme position is testified by his remark that this list cannot be complete even in principle, 
because the entrepreneur’s decisions effectively shape the future environment. The interest 
raised by Shackle’s theory among decision theorists in the 1950s (in particular, see Arrow 
1951, and the essays collected in Bowman 1958 and in Metroeconomica 1959 special issue) 
faded away in the early 1960s. Shackle’s 1961 volume Decision, Order and Time in Human 
Affairs, where he restated the notion of potential surprise as an alternative to probability 
measures and discussed for the first time subjective probability theory, signalled the inability 
of its author to comprehend the critics’ arguments and produced the effect of distancing 
decision theorists from his approach. 
This paper argues that Ellsberg’s and Shackle’s frameworks for discussing the limits 
of the (subjective) probabilistic approach to decision theory are not as different as they may 
appear. To stress the common elements in their theories Keynes’s Treatise on Probability 
provides an essential starting point. Keynes’s rejection of well-defined probability functions 
and of maximisation as a guide to human conduct is shown to imply a reconsideration of what 
probability theory can encompass. Both Ellsberg and Shackle had similar concerns in the 
years of the consolidation of Savage’s new probabilistic mainstream. The parallel between 
Keynes and the two decision theorists will be drawn by means of a particular assessment of 
Shackle’s theory of decision, namely, it will be interpreted in the light of Ellsberg’s doctoral 
dissertation. In this thesis, Ellsberg developed the details and devised the philosophical 
background of his criticism of Savage as first put forward in the famed 1961 QJE article. Our 
general point is that the insights at the basis of the work of both Shackle and Ellsberg, as well 
as the criteria for decision under uncertainty they put forward, are relevant to understand the 
development of modern decision theory.
2 
Section 2 discusses Keynes’s criticism of the frequentist approach to probability 
theory. The goal is to highlight the unconventional points made by Keynes well before the 
consolidation of the mainstream. In this section we stress that Keynes’s view of the potential 
incomparability of alternative probability assessments hints at the crucial notion of weighted 
probabilities. Section 3 reviews the main elements lying at the basis of Shackle’s rejection of 
the probabilistic approach and presents the criterion for choice under uncertainty he proposed. 
Section 4 deals with Ellsberg’s discussion of Shackle’s criterion and analyses Ellsberg’s 
proposal for a theory alternative to subjective expected utility. In section 5 the approaches of 
                                                 
2   Our paper can be intended as a step towards an historical reconstruction of the development of 
modern decision theory in the 1950s, that is, at the time of the making of Savage’s subjective 
probability “revolution.” See also Zappia and Basili (2005).   3
Ellsberg and Shackle are compared. The grounds on which the ambiguity surrounding the 
decision maker in Ellsberg’s urn experiment can be deemed analogous to the uncertainty 
faced by Shackle’s entrepreneur taking unique decisions are pointed out. Section 6 
summarises the argument.  
 
 
2. The Keynesian origins
3 
 
To put it schematically, there are two main traditions in the history of probability theory. 
First, and this is the conventional view, probability is intended as aleatory probability. 
Second, since Jacob Bernoulli and especially after Keynes’s criticism of the classical 
approach, there developed a current assessing probability as referring to epistemic probability 
as well.
4 Both Shackle and Ellsberg discussed probability in the tradition of epistemic 
probability. To seek similarities between Shackle’s and Ellsberg’s approaches two general 
issues stand out as most important: first, the analogy between their views on probability and 
Keynes’s view, and, second, the application of probability to conduct in accordance with 
Keynes’s perspective as put forward in the Treatise on Probability. 
Bernoulli’s notion of probability as presented in his Ars Conjectandi was essentially 
epistemic. He defined probability as a part of certainty and considered it as a measure of 
human knowledge, while games of chance were used as mere examples.
5 Probabilities are 
calculated from arguments: “probabilities are appraised from the number together with the 
                                                 
3    The scattered elements of Keynes’s philosophy of probability discussed in this section 
emphasize, in the main, those aspects which are at the basis of the so-called new Keynesian 
fundamentalism (Lawson 1985, Carabelli 1988 and O’Donnell 1989). However our understanding of 
Keynes’ rejection of well-defined probability functions, and of maximisation as a guide to human 
conduct, points to a theoretical option that is different from the one favoured by most Keynesian 
interpreters. In fact, our interpretation does not imply the rejection of probability theory tout-court, but 
discusses a reformulation of what probability theory can encompass, with specific regard to non-
additive probability measures. More recently Carabelli (2002) has conceded that there is a strong link 
between certain new developments in modern decision theory and Keynes’s probability theory, with 
specific regard to the application to financial markets. 
4   See in particular Hacking 1975, Ch. 6. We use Glen Shaffer’s definition (1978, p. 312-313): 
“Aleatory probabilities find their role in the paradigm of chance; they are number assigned to various 
possible outcomes of a chance event. The aleatory probability (or chance) of each outcome is thought 
to measure its propensity to occur … an epistemic probability on the other hand describes our 
knowledge. It is a number that represents, albeit with a usually ludicrous affectation of precision, the 
degree of which we are certain of something, or alternatively, the degree to which we believe it or the 
degree to which our evidence supports it.” 
5   “Probability is a degree of certainty and differs from it as a part from a whole” (Bernoulli 
1713, p. 211)   4
weight of the arguments which in any way prove or indicate that thing is, will be, or has been. 
By weight, moreover, I mean the force of proof” (Bernoulli 1713, p. 214). To Bernoulli 
arguments are contingent, and contingency is related to human knowledge.
6  
  Like Bernoulli, in the Treatise on Probability Keynes interpreted probability as 
different from chance or frequency: “the identification of probability with statistical frequency 
is a very grave departure from the established use of the words; for it clearly excludes a great 
number of judgments which are generally believed to deal with probability” (1921, p. 109). 
As is well-known, in Keynes’s view (1921, p. 4) probability is a logical relation between two 
sets of propositions:
7 “the terms certain and probable describe the various degrees of rational 
belief about a proposition which different amount of knowledge authorise us to entertain 
…The theory of probability is logical, therefore, because is concerned with the degree of 
belief which is rational to entertain in given conditions” Moreover, “a definition of probability 
is not possible unless it consents us to define degrees of the probability-relation by reference 
to degrees of rational belief.”
8 
Keynes (1921, p. 12) distinguished between direct and indirect knowledge. The former 
is “that part of our rational belief which we know directly;” the latter is “the part which we 
know by argument.” Keynes explained: “our knowledge of propositions seems to be obtained 
in two ways: directly by contemplating the objects of acquaintance and indirectly, by 
argument, through perceiving the probability-relation of the proposition, about which we seek 
knowledge, to other propositions.” It ensues that Keynes is following Bernoulli’s path when 
he argues that indirect knowledge is based on argument and involves a degree of probability 
                                                 
6    Bernoulli distinguished between pure and mixed arguments: “I call those arguments pure 
which prove a thing in certain cases in such a way that they prove nothing positively in other cases. I 
call those arguments mixed which prove the thing in some cases in such a way that they prove the 
contrary in the remaining cases” (Bernoulli 1713, p. 218). As commented by Shafer (1978, p. 329), 
this distinction is remarkable since the possibility of non-additivity lies in the definition of pure 
arguments: as a matter of fact “the evidence of a mixed argument points to both the questions it 
addresses, whereas the evidence of a pure argument points only to the positive side.” Hacking (1975, 
p. 144) notes: “until 1713 it was not in the least determined that that the addition law for probability 
would be accepted. Bernoulli was the last master to contemplate non-additive probabilities.” 
7    Keynes (1921, p. 317) stressed that “a careful examination of all cases in which various 
writers claim to detect the presence of ‘objective chance’ confirms the view that ‘subjective chance’, 
which is concerned with knowledge and ignorance, is fundamental, and the so-called ‘objective 
chance’, however important it may turn out to be from the practical or scientific point of view, is really 
a special kind of ‘subjective chance’ and a derivative type of the latter.”  
8    As a result, Keynes defined the subject matter of the theory of probability as follows: 
“Between two sets of propositions, therefore, there exists a relation, in virtue of which, if we know the 
first, we can attach to the latter some degree of rational belief. This relation is the subject-matter of the 
logic of probability” (Keynes 1921, p. 7). And the notion of probability is closely related to the 
knowledge of the secondary proposition “which assert the existence of probability-relations in the 
fundamental logical sense” (1921, p. 12).   5
lower than certainty: “the knowledge of a secondary proposition leads only to a rational belief 
of the appropriate degree in the primary proposition. The knowledge in this latter case I have 
called knowledge about the primary proposition or conclusion of the argument, as distinct 
from knowledge of it” (1921, p. 15). The Treatise is an attempt to derive knowledge from 
probability arguments. Measurement of probabilities should consider both the magnitude of 
the probability of an argument and the weight of the argument. In Keynes (1921, p. 21), 
measurement of probability means comparison of the arguments, for such a comparison is 
“theoretically possible, whether or not we are actually competent in every case to make.”
9 
Keynes (1921, p. 34) argued then that unknown probabilities can occur only due to 
lack of skill in arguing from given evidence, and not to lack of evidence. This is because “the 
weakness of our reasoning power prevents our knowing what this degree [of probability] is. 
At the best, in such cases, we only know vaguely with what degree of probability the premises 
invest the conclusion.” It follows that a probability is a magnitude between impossibility and 
certainty, that is a number in the interval from 0 to 1; so that when one argues that one 
probability is “greater” than another, “this precisely means that the degree of our rational 
belief in the first case lies between certainty and the degree of the rational belief in the second 
case” (Keynes 1921, p. 37). 
At the same time, Keynes was well aware that the probabilities of two quite different 
arguments can be impossible to compare. Probabilities can be compared if they belong to the 
same series, that is, if they “belong to a single set of magnitude measurable in term of a 
common unit” (35). In contrast, probabilities are impossible to compare if they belong to two 
different arguments and one of them is not (weakly) included in the other. As Keynes (1921, 
p. 38) put it: “some probabilities are not comparable in respect to more or less, because there 
exists more than one path, so to speak, between proof and disproof, between certainty and 
impossibility; and neither of two probabilities, which lies on independent paths, bears to the 
other and to certainty the relation of ‘between’ which is necessary for quantitative 
comparison.” What Keynes is telling us about comparability is evident from the figure in 
chapter 3 of the Treatise (reproduced below in footnote 10). This is a diagram that on the 
horizontal axis has the scale of probability ranging from 0 to 1: every point on this axis can be 
compared to the other points, because there exists a numerical representation of our degree of 
                                                 
9    Keynes (1921, p. 33) distinguished between four alternatives: “in some cases there is no 
probability at all; or probabilities do not all belong to a single set of magnitudes measurable in terms 
of a common unit; or these measures always exist, but in many cases are, and must remain, unknown; 
or probabilities do belong to such a set and their measures are capable of being determined by us, 
although we are not always able so to determine them in practice.”   6
belief about a logical proposition. But in the plane created by the diagram there are also other 
different paths, starting with 0 and ending with 1, which do not lie on the straight line 
between the extremes. Each point on every non-linear path identifies what Keynes calls a 
“non-numerical probability,” but Keynes leaves undetermined the interpretation of the vertical 
dimension.
10 Keynes did not provide a mathematical structure for his probability values, but 
suggested that probabilities lying on the same path can be compared among themselves. 
However he contended that comparisons are possible only among points on the same path (or 
among paths that have points in common). 
In the perspective of the modern theory of decision, the Keynesian paths are nothing 
but distorted probabilities, that is, contractions or expansions of prior linear probabilities. Up 
until the approaches of Rank Dependent Expected Utility (Quiggin 1982, and Yaari 1987) and 
Choquet Expect Utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989), a consistent theory of probability 
distortions was not provided. But it is significant that the issue was paramount in decision 
theory at the time of the making of Savage’s subjective interpretation of probabilities. Since 
the inception of experimental economics it was evident (see in particular Edwards 1954) that 
plenty of experimental evidence challenged the hypothesis that decision-makers act as if they 
were endowed with an additive probability distribution. This experimental evidence 
constitutes the main starting point of Kahneman and Tversky’s work (1979), which discusses 
the usefulness of a weighting function within the framework of their descriptive model of 
decision making under risk.
11 As will be shown later, with respect to this issue both Shackle 
and Ellsberg follow in Keynes’s footsteps. In fact, both Shackle and Ellsberg discussed, 
though under different headings, instances of distorted or weighted probabilities: this reveals 
                                                 
10  Keynes’s diagramme (1921, p. 42).      
 
 
11   Tversky and Wakker (1995) show that prospect theory can be axiomatised by means of a non-
additive measure and hence turned into a model of decision making under uncertainty, labelled 
cumulative prospect theory after Tversky and Kahneman (1992).   7
that their rejection of Savage’s approach has a common origin in Keynes’s probability 
theory.
12  
  Apart from the magnitude of its degree of probability, the second relevant aspect in the 
measurement of an argument is, in Keynes’s view, its weight. Keynes (1921, p. 77) 
maintained that the weight of an argument is correlated, but independent of its degree of 
probability. On the one hand, “the magnitude of probability of an argument depends upon a 
balance between what may be termed the favourable and the unfavourable evidence; a new 
piece of evidence which leaves the balance unchanged, also leaves the probability of the 
argument unchanged.” On the other hand, there exists another characteristic of the arguments 
by which they can be compared, and this is termed the weight, that is, “a balance, not between 
the favourable and the unfavourable evidence, but between the absolute amounts of relevant 
knowledge and of relevant ignorance respectively.” Keynes (1921, p. 77) clarified the 
relationship between magnitude and weight of an argument as follows: “the magnitude of the 
probability of the argument may either decrease or increase, according as the new knowledge 
strengthens the unfavourable or favourable evidence; but something seems to have increased 
in either case … an accession of new evidence increases the weight of an argument. New 
evidence will sometimes decrease the probability of an argument, but it will always increase 
its weight.” Moreover in the case of weight the comparison between arguments with respect 
to less and more is possible only if one is a subset of the other. 
There is a huge literature about the notion of weight of argument in Keynes, basically 
because Keynes did not define weight in a consistent way. For long, the leading interpretation 
was to relate the weight of argument to the notion of second order probability distribution 
(Gardenfors and Sahlin, 1982). The point of this interpretation is that, granted that weight of 
argument is only a probability distribution over the probability distribution on the set of 
                                                 
12   Interestingly enough, in talking about vagueness and numerical measurement of probabilities 
Keynes (1921, 176) maintained that “it is evident that the cases in which exact numerical measurement 
is possible are a very limited class….many probabilities, which are incapable of numerical 
measurement, can be placed nevertheless between numerical limits.” In this way Keynes introduces 
the notion of interval of probability as a representation of ambiguity. Well before both von Neumann 
and Morgenstern and Savage, Koopman (1940) had introduced an axiomatic treatment of intervals of 
probability into probability theory. The notion of upper and lower probabilities was then taken up by 
Good (1950) – who argued that the necessity for intervals arises from the fact that individuals’ initial 
judgements are imperfect – and remained part of a lively, though minor, tradition of thought opposing 
the restrictive interpretation of subjectivism proposed by Savage (in particular see Smith 1961, Shafer 
1976 and Walley 1991). As will be discussed in section 4 below, Ellsberg (2001) referred to Keynes, 
Koopman and Good to argue that a subjectivist tradition emphasising vagueness and indeterminacy in 
probability judgements existed before Savage’s systematisation.   8
events, it is always possible to compare two arguments simply by applying the rule of 
reduction of compound lotteries (Anand, 1991).  
  But this interpretation betrays Keynes’s idea of probability in a crucial sense. The 
weight of argument, though expressing a degree of confidence in a probability assessment, is 
quite a different thing from a probability of a second order. Keynes (1921, p. 345) argued that 
the weight of an argument is “the degree of completeness of the information upon which a 
probability is based,” and it ranges between 0 and 1. He also proposed a precise way to 
calculate it, however, when he stated that a weight is the “balance between the absolute 
amounts of the relevant knowledge and of the relevant ignorance respectively” (Keynes 1921, 
p. 77).
 13  
  In the language of modern decision theory, given an event A, the relevant ignorance 
can be defined as  )) ( ) ( ( 1
C A v A v + − = ψ , that is, as the difference between complete 
knowledge, normalised to the unity, and the probability of the occurrence of the event plus the 
probability of its complement (negation of the event). The weight of argument can be 
represented by  ψ ω − =1 , that is, by the difference between the absolute amount of relevant 
knowledge and the absolute amount of relevant ignorance. It is worth noting that if v is an 
additive probability measure, the relevant ignorance is zero and the weight of argument is 1. 
But if v is a non-additive probability measure (convex capacity), the relevant ignorance is 
different from zero and the weight of argument belongs to the interval zero-one.
14 
Following this interpretation of Keynes’s thought, the significance of the weight of 
argument emerges only when the decision-maker is not endowed with a unique additive 
probability measure and does not behave as an expected utility maximizer. It is worth 
observing that Keynes’s inability to compare magnitude and weight of different arguments 
depends on the lack of a coherent theory through which the decision-maker’s beliefs can be 
                                                 
13  Runde (1990) was the first commentator to call attention to the fact that there are two different 
definitions of weight in the Treatise. He emphasised the importance of the definition of evidential 
weight as the degree of completeness of information on which a probability assessment is based, 
instead of the mere absolute amount of evidence implicit in the second order probability interpretation. 
14   Dow and Verlang (1992) introduced the notion of relative ignorance we refer to in order to 
characterise uncertainty aversion with non-additive measures, drawing on Schmeidler’s (1989) hint 
that the convexity of the capacity v indicates the decision maker’s confidence in the probability 
assessment. Kelsey (1994) discussed a representation of the weight of evidence (that do not collapse 
into second order probability) in terms of a range of possible probabilities and relates it to Gilboa and 
Schmeidler’s maximin expected utility. Vercelli (1999a and 1999b) put emphasis on the link between 
the Keynesian weight and non-additive probability theory.   9
transformed into weighted probabilities.
15 As is implicitly assumed by Keynes, the necessity 
to introduce weighted probability is related to the degree of ambiguity the decision-maker has 
to take into account in a given situation. It will be argued in the following sections that both 
Shackle and Ellsberg focused on the missing link between priors and weighted probabilities. 
They shared this line of research with scholars like Ward Edwards and William Fellner, who 
discussed the soundness of Savage’s subjective approach in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
But, as noted above, it was only recently that an axiomatic theory incorporating a rule to 
substitute decision weights for probabilities was provided: this task was accomplished 
through the rank-ordering of consequences assumed in both Rank Dependent Expected Utility 
and Choquet Expected Utility.
16 As will be shown in the next sections, even with respect to 
this second aspect of the weighing evaluation, Shackle’s and Ellsberg’s analyses are squarely 
in the Keynesian tradition, and not surprisingly point to a solution similar to Keynes’s. In fact, 
they weigh the agent’s evaluation of an ambiguous act by a parameter that represents her 
relative ignorance. 
  There is another aspect of Keynes’s theory is instrumental to our argument. Keynes 
devoted chapter 26 of his Treatise to the application of probability to conduct. His problem 
was the interpretation of “goodness” of choice when “it is not rational for us to believe that 
the probable is true.” Referring to the selection of an appropriate rule of choice, Keynes 
(1921, p. 343) recalled that “normal ethical theory at the present day makes two assumptions: 
first, that degrees of goodness are numerically measurable and arithmetically additive, and 
second, that degrees of probability also are numerically measurable.” As a result, ethical 
theory decides among alternative acts on the basis of their mathematical expectations, which 
he presented as “a technical expression originally derived from the scientific study of 
gambling and games of chance, and stands for the product of the possible gain with the 
probability of attaining it.” Keynes disagrees with a generalized application of mathematical 
expectation for two main reasons: first, because the assumption that “quantities of goodness 
are duly subject to the law of arithmetic, appears to me to be open to a certain amount of 
doubt,” and, second, because to assume that “degrees of probability are wholly subject to the 
                                                 
15    Formally weighed functions are obtained from beliefs by a non-decreasing function 
[] [] 1 , 0 1 , 0 : → λ  with  1 ) 1 ( , 0 ) 0 ( = = λ λ . 
16   All these recent developments presuppose that the decision weight of events depends on the 
rank-ordering of their consequences. That is, consequences are ranked from the best to the worst or 
vice-versa and decision-weights, that add up to one, are derived as the marginal contribution to the 
cumulative distribution function. The distinguishing characteristic of these models is that the 
transformed probability of an outcome depends on the rank of that outcome in the induced preference 
ordering on the set of outcomes (Karni and Schmeidler, 1991).   10
law of arithmetic, runs directly counter to the view which has been advocated in part I… 
[because it] ignores what I have termed the weights of arguments, namely the amount of 
evidence upon which each probability is founded” (Keynes 1921, p. 344). By explicitly 
referring to the probability paths introduced in the diagram of chapter 3 mentioned above, 
Keynes held that “mathematical expectations, of goods or advantage, are not always 
numerically measurable, and hence … even if a meaning can be given to the sum of a series 
of non-numerical mathematical expectations, not every pair of such sums are numerically 
comparable in respect of more and less.” In other words, “it is not always possible by a mere 
process of arithmetic to determine which of the alternative ought be chosen” (Keynes 1921, p. 
344-345). 
In the light of our interpretation of the relationship between weight of argument and 
additivity, it follows that since mathematical expectation neglects the weight of argument this 
is an adequate criterion for choice only if the probabilities are additive, that is, only if the 
weight of argument is one. In all other cases it cannot be applied. As will be shown in the 
following sections, Shackle and Ellsberg rejected the rule of mathematical expectation 
because the decision-makers they assume face ambiguous situations and take the weight of 
(absolute) relevant ignorance into their evaluations, that is, they evaluate a weighed average 
of all possible consequences. Moreover, both Shackle and Ellsberg apply an evaluation 
method that explicitly takes into account the agent’s attitude towards ambiguity. Thus, the 
rationale underlying this last aspect of Keynes’s criticism of aleatory probability indicates that 
Shackle and Ellsberg’s rejection of mathematical expectation has a Keynesian origin. 
 
 
3. Shackle’s non-probabilistic approach 
 
Most economic decisions, Shackle argued (1949, p. 6), are crucial, unique “experiments,” 
namely situations where “the person concerned cannot exclude from his mind the possibility 
that the very act of performing the experiment may destroy forever the circumstances in 
which it was performed.” The fact that these decisions are non-replicable precludes the 
possibility of applying probabilities, both numerical probabilities according to the frequency 
probability theory and, later, subjective probabilities. 
Shackle’s argument had a clear Knightian flavour. The use of probability calculus to 
analyse decisions under uncertainty was inappropriate, in his view, simply because the 
conditions required for its application do not exist in many relevant economic contexts. In   11
actual situations individuals do not have a complete knowledge of the structure of the world. 
Individual choices are made between alternatives which are subjective representations of 
alternative future sequels to actions, and not between future sequels themselves. In Shackle’s 
words, “choice is among imagined experiences,” a view which implies that the individual is 
not given an exhaustive list of the alternatives between which choice should be made.  
In particular, Shackle argued that individuals are not capable of enumerating all 
possible contingencies, or states of the world. This is the main analytical point at the basis of 
Shackle’s theory.
17 On this basis, Shackle developed a formal theory intended to capture both 
the mental processes and the non-repetitive, and often irreversible, nature of actual economic 
decisions. Shackle’s argument was initially intended to oppose the objective frequency-ratio 
interpretation of probability, which he regarded as the mainstream view in the late 1940s. In 
1961, however, he maintained that the same argument could apply to the subjective 
interpretation of probability (Shackle 1961). 
To dispense with probability, Shackle put forward the concept of potential surprise. 
First, he distinguished between distributional uncertainty variables, which can be used if “the 
list [of suggested answers to a question] is complete without a residual hypothesis,” and non-
distributional uncertainty variables, which must be used when “the list in order to attain 
formal completeness must be rounded off with a residual hypothesis” (Shackle 1961, pp. 49-
50). In order to describe the “mental state of uncertainty” of the decision-maker, Shackle 
maintained, “the inclusion of a residual hypothesis in his list of suggested answers is his 
acknowledgement that he has no basis for considering his existing list of particularised 
hypotheses to be comprehensive.” As a result, what was needed was “a measure of 
acceptance, of a hypothesis proposed in answer to some question, that shall be independent of 
the degrees of acceptance simultaneously accorded to rival hypothesis,” a measure such that 
“the individual can give to new rival hypotheses, which did not at first occur to him, some 
degree, and even the highest degree, of acceptance without reducing the degrees of acceptance 
accorded to any of those already present in his mind” (Shackle 1949-50, p. 70). 
Shackle’s potential surprise function then amounts to a substitute for probability 
distributions, to be used under uncertainty. The distinction between distributional and non-
                                                 
17   To economists working in heterodox traditions of thought, like the post-Keynesians and the 
Austrians, this point has become an indispensable analytical reference in their effort to represent 
decisions under genuine uncertainty (for instance see Lachmann 1976, Davidson 1983 and Dow 
1995). In particular, this is the crucial argument upon which the distinction between “rational 
ignorance” and “radical ignorance” has been drawn in the Austrian tradition (Langlois 1994 and 
Vaughn 1994). By this distinction, the Austrians intend to distinguish Savage’s approach from the 
Knightian tradition. On this point see Zappia (1998).   12
distributional variables shows that Shackle’s theory is essentially non-additive, a point he was 
well aware from the beginning (see Shackle 1949-50). This point was discussed by some of 
his critics in the 1950s, who made explicit reference to the possibility of avoiding to dispense 
with probability, but left largely unaddressed by Shackle.
18 
Shackle’s next step was to apply his (non-additive) measure to decision making. He 
analyzed a decision-maker, typically an entrepreneur, who had to choose among alternative 
“sequels” to actions on the basis of two elements: the possible gains and losses embedded in a 
sequel, called face-values, and a valuation of the “possibility” of the gains and losses, called 
potential surprise. The latter element can be considered as a degree of disbelief, or 
implausibility of the hypothesis that supports the sequel; it ranges from 0 (absence of disbelief 
or zero potential surprise) to a maximum value expressing impossibility (absolute disbelief or 
maximum potential surprise).
19 When the decision maker chooses among alternative sequels, 
she re-considers the face-values of each sequel by their degree of potential surprise. 
Finally, Shackle defined a function φ, called “degree of stimulus” (or “ascendancy 
function”) whose arguments are the face-values and the associated potential surprises implicit 
in a sequel. Given a degree of stimulus, it is possible to determine a prospect of the possible 
outcomes of a sequel weighed by degrees of reliability. On this ranking of outcomes, Shackle 
superimposed “the particular potential surprise curve which [the decision maker] assigns to 
some particular project.” It is worth noting that the value of the degree of stimulus is bounded 
from below to 0, when the potential surprise is at its maximum. But it is also bounded from 
above, when the potential surprise is 0, and there is no loss of generality to assume that upper 
bound is normalised to 1. 
                                                 
18    For instance, in his discussion of Shackle’s insistence on the ineffectiveness of expected 
utility, Edwards (1958, 49) argued as follows: “Shackle’s refusal to add subjective improbabilities … 
seems to me to be the most important and desirable feature of his system. A great deal of experimental 
evidence that bears on the additivity of subjective probability is now available and it argues against the 
additive property so strongly that I do not see how it is possible any longer to defend that property. 
Fortunately, it may be possible to develop a utility-subjective probability model that is mathematically 
satisfactory and that does not require subjective probabilities to add to one or anything else.” 
Edwards’s optimism as to the alternatives to subjective expected utility had to wait for many years. A 
similar point was made by Weckstein (1959, p. 110) and dismissed by Shackle (1961, p. 107-108).  
19   The aim of measuring the degree of belief in a certain event by means of its opposite, the 
degree of disbelief, or potential surprise, is instrumental to the construction of a non-additive index. 
The emergence of a new unanticipated event does not necessarily reduce the degree of disbelief 
previously assigned to other events, as it would be if (the opposite of) this degree is measured by a 
probability. “By disbelief I do not now mean the absence of perfect certainty, but the positive 
recognition of some disabling circumstances … and there is, in general, no limit to the number of 
mutually exclusive hypotheses to all of which simultaneously a person can, without logical 
contradiction, attach zero potential surprise” (Shackle 1952, pp. 30-31).   13
Following this procedure Shackle (1953, p. 46) determined “the highest bids which the 
particular project in question can make for the decision maker’s attention and interest. One of 
these bids is the most powerful suggestion of success and the other the most powerful 
suggestion of disaster that the conception of project conveys.” These extreme values represent 
the limits of all possible outcomes of any feasible sequel, after the outcomes and their 
potential surprise are valued in terms of the attitude the decision-maker shows towards the 
uncertain situation. Finally, the criterion for choice Shackle proposed amounts to a rule of 
thumb by which the decision maker takes into account both “the best possible” and the “worst 
possible” outcomes of each sequel, respectively called “focus-gain” and “focus-loss.” 
It must be noted that the ascendancy function has a role that is analogous to the 
Keynesian weight of argument,  since different “degrees of stimulus” select different focus 
values for the same potential surprise function. Or, to put it differently, the potential surprise 
function is the (non-additive) substitute for the (additive) probability function, but its 
significance in the decision process is mediated by the ascendancy function.
20 
This way of formulating a criterion for decisions can be phrased in the language of 
modern decision theory. Shackle’s decision-maker first orders prospect revenues of an act 
(sequel) on the basis of both their value and their degrees of possibility, and then she re-
evaluates them by her specific (that is, relative to the project at hand) attitude towards the 
uncertain environment. At this point, she takes into account the best and the worst outcomes 
involved in the feasible act, instead of calculating an expected value of the act.
21 Eventually 
acts are ranked in terms of the best/worst pairs. 
Shackle was well aware that he was proposing a heresy. “Those accustomed to think 
in terms of the actuarial calculation of the result of a divisible experiment,” Shackle (1953, 
pp. 42-43) admitted, “will find this point exceedingly hard to appreciate.”
22 Nonetheless 
Shackle was clear that he was suggesting a procedure alternative to von Neumann and 
                                                 
20   Among the followers of Shackle, Levi (1966 and 1972) is possibly the only one to insist on 
this point.  
21    Shackle (1953, p. 47) summarises: “because the project is a non-divisible non-seriable 
experiment, his [the entrepreneur] various hypotheses as to its outcome are mutually exclusive and 
therefore there is here no logical basis for the additive procedure by which a ‘mathematical 
expectation’ is assigned to a divisible experiment.” 
22   Shackle’s argument was weakened by the fact that he did not discuss the cognitive bases of the 
advocated procedure of selecting only two values for each sequel of action, apart from scattered 
consideration like the following one: “Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that the decision-maker 
does fix his attention momentarily on one of the interior hypotheses, the idea of a small gain, by 
hypothesis, is perfectly easy to imagine as the outcome of the project. But his attention will not rest on 
that hypothesis. His mind will be immediately challenged by the thought that much larger gains are 
equally easy to imagine: why then stop at the relatively small one?” (Shackle 1953, 42).   14
Morgenstern’s maximin criterion, which Wald (1950) had transformed into a decision rule for 
decisions under complete uncertainty. Shackle (1953, p. 43) first observed that “the 
fundamental hypothesis of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games is that a 
decision-maker will choose that action (strategy) whose worst possible outcome is the least 
bad amongst the respective worst possible outcomes of all the actions open to him.” Then he 
added: when players do not have the “comprehensive, exact and certain knowledge” supposed 
by von Neumann and Morgenstern’s setup, “would the von Neumann and Morgenstern 
hypothesis be more plausible than that the decision-maker will choose that action whose best 
possible outcome is the best amongst the respective best possible outcomes of all the actions 
open to him?” A maximax criterion, Shackle maintained, should be considered equally 
plausible at least. But, he then concluded: 
“there is surely a third [criterion] which is more plausible, and of more general analytical 
power, than either of the two former, namely, that he [the decision-maker] will take into 
account both the ‘best possible’ and the ‘worst possible’ outcome of each course of action and 
make these pairs of outcomes the basis of his decision.” 
 
In the early 1950s the discussion about criteria for decision making was lively. In 
particular, the decision-theoretic view of statistics advanced by Wald had an obvious 
interpretation in terms of decision-making under complete ignorance. Wald (1950) discussed 
the problem of statistical inference as the problem of selecting a strategy, or decision function, 
from several available strategies when all that is known about the state of nature is that it is 
one of a given set of states of nature, that is, as a two-person zero-sum game in which the 
decision maker plays against Nature. The maximin strategy was shown by Wald to be a best 
response against Nature’s minimax strategy, that is, against the least favourable a priori 
distribution Nature can employ. Wald’s criterion is extremely conservative even in a context 
of complete ignorance, though ultra-conservatism may sometimes make good sense.
23 Several 
other criteria were proposed and discussed, and a list of properties of rationality and 
consistency were set forth as a set of axioms to be obeyed by a “rational criterion” (Milnor 
1954 and Chernoff 1954). Among the criteria the most well-known was Hurwicz’s. Hurwicz 
(1951) introduced a parameter intended to obviate the conservative (or pessimistic) procedure 
of concentrating only on states having the worst consequences. Hurwicz’s decision rule 
selects the minimum and the maximum payoff to each given action x, and then associates to 
                                                 
23   It is worth noting that the literature on environmental problems, where decisions are typically 
irreversible and potentially high losses related to catastrophic events are to be considered, makes 
explicit reference to Wald-related criteria (for instance, see Perrings 2003).   15
each action the following index: α max(x) + (1-α) min(x). Of any two actions, the one with 
the maximum index would be preferred. 
In Hurwicz’s view α expresses the degree of optimism the decision-maker is endorsed. 
If  α=0 Hurwicz’s criterion is Wald’s maximin criterion, while if α=1 it is the maximax 
criterion.
24 After labelling Wald’s maximin criterion as “ultraconservative,” Luce and Raiffa 
(1957, p. 282) presented the rationale of Hurwicz’s amendment in the following way: “Why 
not look at the best state, or at a weighted combination of the best and worst?” The 
resemblance with Shackle’s apparently odd statement on von Neumann-Morgenstern’s 
criterion cannot but strike the reader. 
 
 
4. Ellsberg on ambiguity, uncertainty and Shackle 
 
This section deals mainly with Ellsberg’s doctoral thesis, which, although submitted to 
the Harvard Department of Economics in 1962, remained unpublished until very recently 
(Ellsberg, 2001). The thesis elaborates on Ellsberg’s famous critique of Savage’s subjective 
expected utility theory. In particular the thesis supplies both a philosophical background to the 
critique and a thorough discussion of criteria alternative to the maximization of subjective 
expected utility. The insights provided in the thesis are so deep that had Ellsberg decided to 
pursue academic research on these themes his influence on the development of modern 
decision theory would have been even wider than usually recognized.  
  Ellsberg’s thesis started with a thorough analysis of the theories of those economists, 
mathematicians, and statisticians who had emphasized vagueness and imprecision of 
subjective assessments before his criticism of Savage. In the 1961 article Ellsberg had defined 
ambiguity as a situation differing from both risk and ignorance in Knight’s sense. The article, 
which opens with the Knightian distinction between risk as measurable uncertainty and 
uncertainty as unmeasurable uncertainty, aims to counter scepticism about the behavioural 
significance of the distinction. In order to do so Ellsberg concentrated on a few decisional urn 
problems in which the information about the contents of the urn can be described with 
accuracy, but induces, in cases contemplating also urns with unknown proportion of balls of 
different colours, deliberate violations of Savage’s sure thing principle. Ellsberg (1961, p. 
                                                 
24    Because of its derivation from Wald, Hurwicz’s decision rule can be termed α-maximin. 
Though discussed in the 1950s as one of the possible criteria for decision-making under complete 
ignorance, Hurwicz’s paper was not published and circulated only as discussion paper. The criterion is 
best known as Arrow-Hurwicz criterion because it was published only in Arrow and Hurwicz 1972.   16
657) claimed that the nature of the individual’s information concerning the likelihood of 
events was a relevant dimension of the decision problem, and proposed to called it the 
ambiguity of information, “a quality depending on the amount, type, reliability and 
‘unanimity’ of information” expressing the individual’s “degree of confidence in an estimate 
of relative likelihoods.” After discussing the urn problems, however, Ellsberg noted “the 
ambiguity surrounding the outcome of a proposed innovation, a departure from current 
strategy, may be much more noticeable,” thus hinting at uncertainty proper.
25 
In the much deeper analysis of his thesis, on the other hand, Ellsberg (2001, Ch. 1) 
quoted at length Keynes’s Treatise on Probability, mostly because Keynes had inspired 
Koopman’s and Good’s use of interval probabilities. Ellsberg showed that, before the new 
subjectivist mainstream consolidated, there was a lively tradition of thought using a 
probabilistic view of decision-making. This tradition was more multifarious than usually 
recognized, insofar as it included economists like Knight, Keynes, and Shackle, philosopher 
mathematicians like Koopman, Hurwicz and Good, and statisticians like Wald, Hodges, and 
Lehmann. These authors shared, on different grounds, the same contention about the 
meaningfulness of assuming that subjective beliefs could be always represented by point 
probabilities. They formulated criteria for choice alternative to maximization of expected 
utility, as re-affirmed by von Neumann and Morgenstern and Savage in the tradition of Daniel 
Bernoulli and classical probability. 
  Ellsberg’s aim (2001, p. 12) is explicitly posited: 
 
“Actually, the theories of Koopman and the more recent analyses of I. J. Good seem to me to 
go far towards rendering the concepts of relative ‘sureness’ and ‘vagueness’ less vague in 
themselves. I hope in the present study to add to that development; and beyond that, to 
develop meaningful and useful hypotheses on appropriate decision criteria for basing action, 
reasonably and systematically, upon ‘vague’ and ‘unsure’ options.” 
 
                                                 
25   Ellsberg (1961, 653) noted that Knight, in discussing an urn situation analogous to the one he 
himself was proposing (in particular the two-colour urn example), did not oppose the intuition implicit 
in the so-called principle of insufficient reason. That is to say that people missing statistical 
information on the composition of the urn should act, according to Knight, on the supposition that the 
chances of balls of different colours were equal. In Ellsberg’s view this assumption would contradict 
the significance of Knight’s own distinction between measurable and unmeasurable uncertainty. 
Keynes (1921, 53-54) too had discussed the two-colour urn example, but, unlike Knight, with the 
intent to give a critical account of the limits of the principle of insufficient reason, in accordance with 
the idea that in situations where information is scanty or perceived to be vague the traditional approach 
to probability is not adequate. Ellsberg did not quote Keynes’s Treatise on Probability in the 1961 
article, because he did not read it until working on the definite draft of the thesis (Ellsberg, personal 
communication, June 2005). On this point see also Feduzi 2005.   17
Shackle is a major reference in the thesis. He is criticized
26 for his extreme position, 
namely, for rejecting a representation of uncertainty in terms of numerical probabilities not 
only in ambiguous situations but in any situation of crucial importance to the decision-maker. 
However, argues Ellsberg, “when ambiguity is extreme, by any of his indices: relevant 
information sparse, or obviously unreliable and contradictory; wide differences in the 
expressed expectations of different individuals; low confidence in available estimates,” 
Shackle’s “somber reflections” seem “too ominously relevant to the very circumstances upon 
which this study focuses to be dismissed” (Ellsberg 2001, pp. 16-17).
27 
A point is worth noting. Granted that Ellsberg (2001, p. 2) started his analysis by 
defining decision-making under ambiguity as a special case of decision-making under 
uncertainty, he contended that the arguments he was raising against the use of subjective 
expected utility in case of ambiguity, as well as the solutions he was proposing, were valid a 
fortiori to deal with the “broader problem” of uncertainty. 
Ellsberg’s thesis contains a more accurate discussion of the examples known from the 
QJE article and a full treatment of the philosophical background of his stance. More 
relevantly from our viewpoint, there is a comparison between alternative criteria for 
explaining the observed departures from Savage’s axioms, and this comparison includes 
decision rules not discussed in the article. In particular Ellsberg considers both maximin 
expected utility and the more general α-maximin version put forward by Hurwicz. As in the 
1961 article, Ellsberg aimed to find out a decision rule alternative to subjective expected 
utility that could account for the behaviour of unrepentant violators of Savage’s axioms. In 
1961 Ellsberg’s solution had been a weighted average of the expectation of the most reliable 
(“best guess”) probability distribution and the maximin solution. The idea came from Hodges 
and Lehmann (1952), who had taken as starting point a set of plausible probability 
distributions as priors, instead of a unique probability, and had discussed how the decision-
maker could use them. A decision-maker who fails to rule out of a set of distributions any one 
as unacceptable, nonetheless may regard one of them as the most reliable.
28 Accordingly the 
                                                 
26    As in the 1961 article, Ellsberg quotes Shackle’s example of coin-tossing in cricket test 
matches. Here Shackle, in order to emphasize his point, unintelligibly refuses to take into account 
statistical information on the aleatory mechanism. Shackle’s insistence that, under certain conditions, 
all unique events are crucial and therefore frequency-ratios are irrelevant contributed to his 
marginalization. 
27   This consideration of Ellsberg reflects the attitude of many critics of Shackle, who at the time 
of Expectations in Economics showed great interest in Shackle’s insights but subsequently interest 
faded in the face of the cumbersome formal structure. On this point see Zappia and Basili 2005.  
28   Ellsberg (2001, p. 182) summarises the rationale under the use of multiple probabilities as 
follows: “under most circumstances of decision-making you can eliminate, from the set Y of all   18
decision rule adopted by Ellsberg (1961, p. 664) was to associate the following index with 
each act x: ρ E(x) + (1-ρ) min(x).
29 The parameter [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ ρ  expresses reliability, that varies 
between absence of confidence and absolute confidence, and that weighs the additive 
distribution serving as a best estimate as well as all other possible probability distributions 
assumed to be reasonable by a decision-maker under ambiguity.  
In the 1962 thesis Ellsberg, in accordance with Hodges and Lehmann, retains the idea 
of a set of distributions over the states of the world, but applies the Hurwicz criterion to the 
restricted set of possible distributions. The new index, called “restricted Bayes/Hurwicz 
criterion,” is: ρ E(x) + (1-ρ) [α max(x) + (1-α) min(x)]. Ellsberg presented a taxonomy of the 
possible criteria in terms of the two parameters ρ and α, that is in terms of the degrees of 
confidence and optimism, respectively, characterising the epistemic state of the decision-
maker.  
Two points are worth making before moving on to a comparison between Ellsberg and 
Shackle. First, in discussing Hurwicz Ellsberg (2001, p. 163, 190) notes the analogies of 
Hurwicz’s rule with Shackle’s analysis. Ellsberg infers that Shackle’s decision rule amounts 
to a generalization of Hurwicz’s criterion: “the Hurwicz rule corresponds to a special case in 
which the indifference sets in Shackle’s gambler indifference map are parallel straight lines, 
with slope dependent on α.” In Ellsberg’s thesis, thus, it is argued for the first time that 
Shackle’s criterion for ranking acts is nothing but a generalized version of Hurwicz’s 
criterion. As noted by Levi (2001, xxiii) in his introduction to Ellsberg 2001, it is regrettable 
that Luce and Raiffa did not note this in their influential survey of decision making under 
uncertainty (Luce and Raiffa, 1957, Chap. 13). 
The second point concerns the significance of the decision rules Ellsberg privileged. 
To a large extent Ellsberg referred to a model of ambiguity aversion currently known as the 
maximin expected utility model (MEU) after Gardenfors and Sahlin (1982). This model, by 
virtue of the axiomatisation provided by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), is possibly the most 
referred to in the current literature in decision-making under uncertainty. Moreover, as will be 
                                                                                                                                                          
possible probability distributions over the relevant states of the world, certain distributions as 
unacceptable for representing your opinion … But … there may remain a sizeable subset Y° of 
distributions … that still seem ‘reasonable acceptable’ … that do not contradict your (‘vague’) 
opinions [and that] may yet be large, particularly when relevant information is perceived as scanty, 
unreliable, contradictory, ambiguous.” 
29   Where E(x) is the expected payoff to the act corresponding to the best guess distribution, 
min(x) is the minimum expected payoff to the act as the probability distribution ranges in the set of 
non-unacceptable distributions, and ρ represent the degree of confidence in the best guess distribution. 
Following Hodges and Lehmann, Ellsberg called the criterion “restricted Bayes.” The adjective 
restricted hints of course to the set of plausible priors.   19
seen in the next section, recent developments (see for instance Girardato, Maccheroni and 
Marinacci 2003) put to work the intuition under Hurwicz (and Shackle) criterion in their 
axiomatisation of the so-called α-MEU criterion.  
 
 
5. Shackle’s and Ellsberg’s frameworks compared 
 
As seen in the previous sections, awareness of missing information and partial knowledge is 
crucial to an understanding of the implications of Shackle’s approach to decision-making. 
Shackle’s entrepreneur is supposed to invest in a context in which the list of possible future 
states of the world is not necessarily complete. As a result, Shackle’s entrepreneur does not 
maximise expected utility, and uses a peculiar criterion for ranking acts. 
Shackle’s decision problem shares an essential feature with the decision problem from 
which Ellsberg paradox emerges. In our view, both decision-making problems refer to an 
epistemic state that can be represented by the notion of ambiguity, a notion which belongs to 
the region between the two extremes of complete ignorance and risk.
30 At first the two 
problems seem quite different since to Ellsberg the question is one of ambiguous probabilities 
with a complete list of all possible events, whereas Shackle aims to discuss situations in 
which the list of possible events in not exhaustive. But this difference has more to do with the 
degree than with the quality of uncertainty faced by decision-makers. In fact, in both decision-
making problems the individual faces two kinds of possible events, that is unambiguous and 
ambiguous events. The decision-maker has a clear perception of the unambiguous events and 
is able to attach a unique probability distribution to them; this means that her choice involves 
risk only. But she has also a vague knowledge of ambiguous events and she considers only 
her own representation of an uncertain situation as an approximate description of the “true” 
scenario. In this second case she is unable to attach a unique probability to each state of the 
                                                 
30   Putting the degree of knowledge on an axe, we can establish the following order: certainty, 
risk, ambiguity, and complete ignorance. It ensues that characterizing these points by means of 
probability would imply the following definitions: (a) certainty: the probability of a state A in the state 
space is one; (b) risk: there exists a single additive and fully reliable probability distribution, either 
objective or subjectively determined, on the state space; (c) ambiguity: there exist more than one 
additive probability distribution, or an interval of probability for each state is assumed to be possible. 
Both a capacity (non-additive probability) on the state space and a fuzzy measure are alternative 
representations of the epistemic state of the decision-maker; (d) complete ignorance: either all states of 
the world have the same probability of occurring, on the basis of the principle of insufficient reason, or 
there is no reliable probability distribution, on the basis of the rejection of the principle of insufficient 
reason.    20
world because either she does not know them or she is unable to distinguish clearly among 
them. She can be unable to list each state included in an event, but she can also be unable to 
attach the “true” probability to each state. As a consequence, the decision-maker’s ambiguity 
deriving from incomplete knowledge can be represented by measures that are alternative to a 
single additive probability, like an interval of probabilities, a set of probabilities, a capacity, 
or a fuzzy measure. 
In the early 1950s there was a notable interest in Shackle’s theory exactly because he 
had made the point just considered explicit.
31 In facing situations that cannot be represented 
by a single additive probability distribution over their outcomes, the decision-maker has to 
evaluate alternative courses of action by an alternative measure, which Shackle called 
potential surprise. This measure entails the use of a procedure of choice based on non-additive 
expected value.
32 Both Shackle and Ellsberg assume that the decision-maker has partial 
knowledge about the future states of the world, and faces ambiguity in the sense of our 
definition, that is, she is aware of the unreliability of a single, additive probability distribution. 
What is relevant, as a result, is the representation of the “small world” in which the decision-
maker has to act. Once assessed from this viewpoint Shackle’s and the Ellsberg’s scenarios 
are analogous; in fact both are misrepresentations of the hypothetical “grand world” in which 
all future states of the world are (potentially) completely described. 
The distinction between small and grand worlds is credited to Savage. The grand 
world is a complete list of the states that are of concern to an individual. The small world is a 
construction derived from a certain partition of the grand world into events, a partition which 
                                                 
31    See for instance Arrow 1951. Arrow (1951, p. 404) gave sizeable relevance to Shackle’s 
analysis because it was the single formalised theory among those put forward by a group of authors 
who, following in Knight and Keynes’s footsteps, “do use other than probability statements in their 
description of behaviour under uncertainty.” Zappia and Basili (2005) assess the intellectual 
environment in which Shackle’s theory was discussed in the years between Expectations in Economics 
(Shackle 1949) and the last restatement of its main theses in Decision, Order and Time in Human 
Affairs (Shackle 1961). 
32   It is worth noting that even in Shackle’s scenario an investment decision can be considered as 
a bet. But Shackle rejected the main consequence of de Finetti’s notion of probability as a bet, that is, 
the corollary that if someone is rejecting a bet she is accepting its complementary bet. Shackle argued 
as follows: “when the uncertainty in a person's mind arises from the plurality of the answers which 
suggest themselves to him for some one question, these answers are rivals mutually excluding each 
other. To believe in one of these answers is therefore to disbelieve in the others. By contrast it is not 
true that to disbelieve in one answer is to believe in the others” (Shackle1961, 74). This is a necessary 
consequence of the assumption of non-additivity. As is usually recognised in current decision theory, 
under ambiguity the decision-maker may reject both sides of the bet, and her epistemic attitude can be 
represented by either capacities or non-additive measures.   21
constitutes the states of the small-world.
33 Savage (1954, p. 9) maintained that an individual 
usually confines her attention to a relatively simple situation in almost all decisions; this 
amounts to say that, in practice, the individual is always concerned with a small world, which 
is “derived from a larger [one] by neglecting some distinctions between states, not by 
ignoring some [grand-world] states outright.” By taking a small world as the proper context of 
her decisions, the decision-maker obtains an approximate description of the states of the 
world and their consequences. In principle, the individual can gradually come to consider an 
even more refined and detailed small world, until she arrives at the grand world where 
everything is taken into account. However, Savage’s point is that it is “utterly ridiculous” to 
pretend that “one envisages every conceivable policy for the government of his whole life (at 
least from now on) in its most minute details, in the light of a vast number of unknown states 
of the world” (Savage 1954, p. 16). 
Savage (1954, pp. 82-84) claimed that subjective expected theory should be applied 
only to small worlds. In fact, it is only in small worlds that all possibilities can be 
exhaustively enumerated in advance, and all implications of all possibilities explored in 
detail; hence the possibilities can be labelled and placed in their proper positions as in the 
famous omelette example. Savage stressed the “practical necessity of confining attention to, 
or isolating, relatively simple situations in almost all applications of the theory of decision 
developed.”
34 But he admitted that the representation provided by a small world “is 
completely satisfactory only if it is actually a microcosm, that is, only if it leads to a 
probability measure and a utility well articulated with those of the grand world” (Savage 
1954, p. 88). Leaving utility aside, in Savage’s view there is no certainty that the probability 
of an event in the small world equals the probability of the corresponding collection of states 
in the grand world. If probabilities are different at the two degrees of refinement, the 
probabilities attached in the small world are “correct” only if they equal those calculated in 
the grand world. Thus the implicit assumption is that the individual should ultimately be able 
to deal with the grand world, since the condition which assures equality in probability “seems 
incapable of verification without taking the grand world much too seriously” (Savage 1954, p. 
90). There is a decisive implication here: if the theory is to be consistently applied, the 
decision-maker should be able to enumerate exhaustively all possibilities in advance, and to 
                                                 
33   A “small world … is determined not only by the definition of a state, but also by the definition 
of small-world consequences. A small-world consequence is a grand-world act” (Savage 1954, p. 85). 
34    Savage’s rejection of the critiques of his theory arguing that “real people frequently and 
flagrantly behave in disaccord with utility theory,” is mainly based on the distinction between the 
grand and the small world (Savage 1954, pp. 100-101).    22
explore all consequences in detail, though she works exclusively in a practical setting called 
the small world; thereby it is as if she had a sort of “divine” knowledge of the outside world. 
As a result, in situations in which outcomes and states are not clearly given in the description 
of the problem, it is clear neither what the normative implications of Savage’s sure-thing 
principle are, nor why Savage’s expected utility approach should inform actual behaviour.  
This representation of the decision-theoretic context in terms of small and grand world 
has a counterpart in modern decision theory. In Gilboa and Schmeidler (1994), in particular, 
the space of real-valued functions on the original space (the small world in which the 
decision-maker acts) is embedded in a larger state space (the grand world) in an integral-
preserving way. In this way the set of states of the small world that is relevant for the 
decision-maker may be a mis-specified  representation because either certain possible states 
that are accounted for in the larger space are missing or she is unable to split an event into its 
constitutive states (singleton) in the small world. If “omitted stated of the world were 
introduced into the model explicitly the non-additivity would disappear” (Gilboa and 
Schmeidler 1994, p. 13). 
It is time to sum up our argument on the analogy between Shackle and Ellsberg. Both 
authors talk of decision-making problems located in Savage’s small world. But Shackle and 
Ellsberg’s small worlds are not microcosm, that is, the decision-maker is unable to split an 
event in the small world into the states composing the event in the grand world. To be precise, 
in both scenarios the decision-maker is unable to enumerate the single mutually exclusive 
possible future states of the world. In other words, the decision-maker has only a rough 
representation (partition) of the set of states of the world. That is, she acts on the basis of a 
partition that is a not fine enough and, as a result, she cannot apply Savage’s rule for the 
optimal choice.
35 
  This interpretation of Shackle’s theory is not customary especially in Keynesian 
circles, which emphasize that the unanticipated events Shackle referred to need to be outside 
the list of states (inaccurately) assumed to be exhaustive in probabilistic decision-making (for 
instance, see Davidson 1983 and Dow 1995).
36 However, our point is that the “novelty” 
                                                 
35   Savage himself observes that if the decision-maker is unable to define a microcosm she can 
not apply the maximisation of subjective expected utility  
36    In his recent assessment of Shackle’s probability theory, Runde (2000) maintains that 
Shackle’s objections to the assumption about the absence of the residual hypothesis remain 
unaddressed in orthodox theory. Runde refers to Gilboa and Schmeidler’s non-additive probability in a 
footnote, but contends that it addresses situations, like the Ellsberg paradox, “where the problem is one 
of ambiguous probabilities rather than that of providing an exhaustive list of states.” We have tried to 
show that this distinction is no longer accurate.   23
characterising choices in uncertain situations can be more fruitful interpreted as an inability to 
discern the elementary states composing the event, an inability that may be solved, given 
Shackle’s approach, through the passing of time. Shackle (1956, p. 115) himself hinted at this 
interpretation in a paper on the “logic of surprise:” 
“An actual experience will cause surprise when an imperfect image of it has been formed in 
advance; and the imperfectness can consist either in some wrong characteristics or details 
being specified in place of the right ones, or in blanks having being left in the picture, that is, 
it can consist in characteristics or details which in fact belong to the experience having being 
omitted altogether; or again we can say, in the experience having a ‘dimension’ beyond the 
list of those which the individual can specify in advance.” 
 
The point we are emphasizing is analogous to the one made by Arrow and Hurwicz in 
their 1972 paper, often quoted in the literature on “complete ignorance” as the main building 
block for theories of decision-making alternative to Savage’s (for instance, see Barrett and 
Pattanaik 1993).
37 Arrow and Hurwicz (1972, p. 1) provided “a possible characterisation of 
the concept of complete ignorance,” which they defined as, first, “a situation in which there is 
no a priori information available which gives any state of nature a distinguished position”, 
and, second, as a situation “not presupposing a fixed list of states of nature.” In situations of 
complete ignorance, Arrow and Hurwicz (1972, p. 2) argued, the subjective probability 
framework can only assign equal probabilities to all states of nature, in accordance with 
Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason. Shackle’s formulation, on the other hand, “permits 
to interpret complete ignorance as meaning that all states of nature have zero potential 
surprise. Then dividing a state of nature into two would have no effect on the action chosen, if 
the reward to an action is the same under either substate.” Arrow and Hurwicz concluded that 
if a description of the world needs making finer than previously anticipated (a likely situation 
if complete ignorance is assumed), this can be done easily in Shackle’s framework, but not in 
the subjectivists.’
38 As seen in the previous sections, Shackle viewed this capability of 
accounting for new, unanticipated events as the main reason for dispensing with probability 
measures and the use of potential surprise in its place. 
                                                 
37   As recalled above, this is the published version of Hurwicz 1951a, including the basic proof 
provided by Arrow (1953) that any criterion satisfying certain basic properties under complete 
ignorance must be of the Hurwicz(-Shackle) type. On this point see also the discussion in this section. 
38   In the subjectivist approach, if the event to which choices are conditioned is not in the list of 
the possible states the decision maker is forced to modify the probability weights originally attributed 
to the states, because these weights add up to 1. As noted in the previous section, Shackle insisted that 
a correct representation of the epistemic state of an individual should make room for a “residual 
hypothesis” - that is, the realisation of an unanticipated state - without reducing the weights attributed 
to the original list of states. However, this can be achieved also in a probabilistic approach, if the 
probability measure on the original list of states is superadditive.   24
  After dealing with the main similarity between Ellsberg’s notion of ambiguity and 
Shackle’s notion of fundamental uncertainty, two other similarities remain to be examined. 
Both similarities were highlighted by Ellsberg in his doctoral thesis, and are discussed at 
length by Levi (1972 and 1980). 
The first important aspect that makes the two decision-problems analogous emerges 
from a comparison between the valuation functions of the hypothetical gains and losses (the 
“degree of stimulus,” in Shackle’s set-up), and the “reliability” that characterizes the decision-
maker’s information in Ellsberg’s paradox. As seen above, the degree of stimulus can be 
interpreted as a function representing the decision-maker’s degree of confidence in her 
representation of the (small) world.
39  As already illustrated, Shackle and Ellsberg share a 
method for evaluating the value of an ambiguous act that is different from Savage. Moreover, 
Shackle and Ellsberg’s approaches are analogous as to the conclusion they reach. After 
recognizing the existence of ambiguity, they assume that the decision-maker will take into 
account her own attitude with respect to ambiguity, that is, she will weighs her beliefs with a 
judgment about the quality of her knowledge. The measure they use is nothing but an 
alternative formulation of Keynes’s weight of argument, as Ellsberg himself recognised 
(1961, p. and 2001, p. ). But, contrary to Ellsberg’s opinion, this holds true not only if the 
weight of argument is interpreted as a measure of the amount of evidence relevant to a certain 
hypothesis, but also if it is interpreted as the degree of completeness of the evidence. As 
argued in section 3, if probabilities are assumed to be non-additive, even using the second 
definition the weight ranges from 0 to 1, and represents the reliability of the information at 
hand. 
The second main aspect is related to the criterion for choice Shackle and Ellsberg 
proposed. In the main both authors hinted at the same procedure Hurwicz adopted, with the 
relevant difference that Ellsberg used Hurwicz criterion while Shackle proposed a decision 
rule which turned out to be of the Hurwicz type.  In their 1972 paper, they clarified from the 
outset that under these hypotheses the criterion they provided differed from that formulated 
within the “now more standard subjective probability framework,” and that their arguments 
and conclusions “are much closer to Shackle’s (1949) than those of Ramsey (1931), de Finetti 
(1937), and Savage (1954).” Arrow and Hurwicz were the first authors (after Ellsberg in his 
unpublished thesis) to make the point that Shackle’s criterion was more accurate than 
                                                 
39   This point is implicitly made by Arrow and Hurwicz  (1972, p.2) when they argue that “the 
standardized focus-gain and focus-loss become simply the maximum and minimum payoff to a given 
action, and the final decision among possible actions is made on the basis of the gambler indifference 
map, which in this case of complete ignorance, simply order these pairs.”   25
previously admitted. Proceeding along the lines of Chernoff (1954) and Milnor (1954), Arrow 
and Hurwicz (1972) postulated, first, a set of “desirable” properties of a rational criterion of 
choice. These are mostly properties regarding the relationships between sets of actions, 
identified as decision problems; these sets permit the identification of the minimum and the 
maximum value associated with each decision problem under any particular state of nature. 
Second, they proved that the necessary and sufficient conditions guaranteeing that an 
optimality criterion possesses the postulated properties are related only to the minimum and 
the maxim value. That is, any criterion consistent with those desirable properties ranks actions 
solely on the basis of their best and worst possible outcomes, and not on the basis of averages. 
Finally, Arrow and Hurwicz (1972, p. 2) commented on Shackle’s theory that if the focus 
values of Shackle are interpreted as the minimum and maximum payoff to a given action, and 
the final decision among possible actions is made on the basis of the gambler indifference 
map, “we demonstrate that a plausible set of desirable properties for a rational criterion of 
choice under complete ignorance in fact leads to this special case of Shackle’s theory.”  
It is appropriate to outline the importance of the Arrow-Hurwicz criterion for modern 
decision theory. As noted earlier the Arrow-Hurwicz criterion has originated a literature on 
decision making under complete ignorance. Savage’s subjective expected utility theory 
applies to situations in which the individual acts as if he had a single reliable probability 
distribution over the states of the world (elicited from choices). Conversely, Arrow and 
Hurwicz introduced the case in which the individual has no idea at all about the likelihood of 
states. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) have proposed an alternative to subjective expected 
utility to encompass the case between these two extremes, that is the case in which the 
individual has opinions about the likelihood of different states, but she is not able to assign 
exact probabilities to them. According to their theory the decision maker has a convex set of 
subjective probability, which expresses the range of probabilities she considers possible. 
Since the subjective probability is not unique there is a set of expected utilities for each 
action. Gilboa and Schmeidler then propose the following criterion: an action a is preferred to 
b if and only if the minimum possible value of the expected utility of a is greater than the 
minimum expected value of b. They have called this criterion maximin expected utility 
(MEU). If the set of probabilities consists only of a single probability distribution, maximin 
expected utility coincides with subjective expected utility. If, on the other hand, it consists of 
all possible probability distributions it coincides with Wald’s maximin.  
There is a close relationship between maximin expected utility and non-additive 
probability theory which needs emphasising. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1994) showed that there   26
is an isomorphism between a non-additive probability measure and a convex set of additive 
probability measure. The interest in non-additive measure stays in the fact that the behaviour 
of decision-makers exhibiting a pessimistic attitude towards uncertain situations and can be 
rationalised through the use of a sub-additive probability measure. As noted earlier, in both 
the contexts discussed by Ellsberg and Shackle the decision-maker’s beliefs can be 
represented by non-additive probabilities (or capacities).
40 Since the capacity is a non-additive 
measure, the integration of a real-valued function with respect to it is impossible in the 
Lebesgue sense. Schmeidler (1989) has provided the axiomatic structure to show that the 
proper integral for a capacity is the Choquet integral. The Choquet integral with respect to a 
capacity is a generalisation of the Lebesgue integral, which requires that states of the world 
have been ranked from the most to the least favourable ones, or vice versa, with respect to 
their consequences. As a result, the Choquet integral is a generalisation of the mathematical 
expectation usually used in expected utility models with respect to a capacity.
41  
Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) accommodates both Shackle’s and Ellsberg’s 
evidences. Moreover if the convex capacity that represents the decision-maker’s beliefs has a 
non-empty core of additive measures, than the CEU with respect to the capacity equals the 
MEU of the set of additive measures, that is, the SEU with respect to the less favourable 
probability distribution in the core.  In particular if a simple capacity is considered to model 
ambiguity it is evident that a non-additive measure is only a contraction of a probability 
distribution, except that for the universe.
42 The utility of an act is only the weighted average 
utility, or the Choquet integral with respect to a capacity is the difference between minima of 
regular integrals over sets of additive measures (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1994). 
More recently a slightly different measure has been proposed under the heading of α-
MEU approach. Girardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2005) assume that the decision-
maker’s ambiguity is expressed by a set of additive probability distributions (multiple priors) 
                                                 
40   A convex capacity is monotone measure that is normalised to 1 on the full set and 0 on the 
null set, like probability, but, unlike probability, the sum of the capacities of two subsets may be 
strictly less than the capacity of the union of these sets. The convexity of the capacity is the property 
suggested by the Ellsberg Paradox. 
41   The Choquet integral of an act f with respect to the capacity µ is 
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and the parameter α represents her ambiguity attitude.
43 The α-MEU preference model is a 
generalization of the Hurwicz’s maximin functional in which the parameter α is constant.
44 As 
a consequence, the Shackle’s and the Ellsberg’s approach can be considered as variations of 





This paper has discussed the relationship between Ellsberg and Shackle in terms of their 
representation of the environment for actual decision-making. Shackle (1955) rejected 
probabilistic reasoning per se, and accordingly formulated a non-probabilistic theory of 
decision-making under uncertainty. Ellsberg (1961), who stressed the failure of Savage’s 
sure-thing axiom in ambiguous contexts, sought criteria of decision-making alternative to 
subjective expected utility. In his doctoral thesis Ellsberg (2001) noted that the decision rule 
that accommodates for decisions taken by violators of Savage’s axiom (a rule put forward by 
Hurwicz) was a special case of Shackle’s decision rule.  
We have argued that the similarities between Ellsberg and Shackle are more relevant 
than Ellsberg himself recognised. First, we have emphasised that both authors’ analyses have 
a common origin in Keynes’s theory of probability and, more specifically, in a peculiar 
interpretation of Keynes’s weight of argument. Second, we have interpreted Shackle’s 
fundamental uncertainty and Ellsberg’s ambiguity as two instances of the same representation 
of the decision problem, namely one in which the uncertainty characterising the environment 
is expressed in terms of a “small world” interpretation. 
Our historical reconstruction is meant to have theoretical implications. Basically, our 
claim is that Keynes, Shackle and Ellsberg can decisively enrich decision analysis by virtue of 
                                                 
43   The α-MEU preferences,  [] 1 , 0 ∈ α are represented by the functional  
) ( min ) 1 ( ) ( max ) ( f u E f u E f I o o π π π π
α α
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where П is a set of additive probability distributions. 
44   The α-MEU approach establishes a connection between the opposite valuations (the best and 
the worst) of each act, given a set of relevant probability distributions. The functional shows a 
sandwiching property, because it is placed between the worst and the best scenario evaluation of the 
decision maker. Straightforwardly, the assumed constant function αis an index of ambiguity aversion: 
the lower (higher) it is, the smaller (larger) the pessimism in the decision maker’s evaluation is. If α is 
equal to zero, then a standard CEU functional is obtained. In a similar vein Basili, Chateauneuf and 
Fontini (2005) proposes a functional in which the decision maker is supposed to split outcomes 
between familiar and un-familiar ones.   28
certain recent developments in non-additive probability theory, which make it possible to 
incorporate their idiosyncratic views in a substantial body of theory. 
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